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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Issue No. L Did the trial court correctly rule as a matter of law that Utah Code 
Ann. § 14-2-2(1), which imposes liability on a project owner for failure to obtain a 
payment bond, anticipates and includes liability for rental equipment? 
Standard of Review. Courts of appeal review "grants of summary judgments under 
the 'correctness' standard " Palmer v. Hayes, 892 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995) (citing Neiderhauser Builders & Dev. Corp. v. Campbell, 824 P.2d 1193, 1196 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992)). 
Issue No. 2. Did the trial court correctly rule as a matter of law that the measure of 
damages under Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-2(1) for failure to obtain a payment bond is the 
market value of the equipment supplied, not the value actually received by the owner? 
Standard of Review. The same correction-of-error standard of review that governs 
Issue No. 1 applies. 
Issue No. 3. Did the trial court correctly act within its broad discretion in awarding 
T.S.S. its attorneys' fees under Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-2(3)? 
Standard of Review. Courts of appeal review a trial court's decision to award or 
deny attorneys' fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-2(3) for an abuse of discretion. 
Bailey-Allen Co., Inc. v. Kurzet, 876 P.2d 421, 428 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) ("[SJection 
1 
14-2-2(3) endows the trial court with discretion in awarding attorney fees. We must 
therefore determine whether the trial court's denial of those fees constituted an abuse of 
discretion.") 
Issue No. 4. Did the trial court correctly rule as a matter of law that T.S.S. was 
entitled to recover interest on its judgment against Saratoga at the contract rate of 18%? 
Standard of Review. The same correction-of-error standard of review that governs 
Issue No. 1 applies. 
GOVERNING LAW 
The following constitutional and statutory provisions are of central importance to 
the outcome of this appeal: Utah Code Ann. §§ 14-2-1 and 14-2-2 (collectively referred 
to as the "Payment Bond Statutes"). Saratoga sets forth the relevant text of § 14-2-2 in its 
brief. It does not, however, set forth the relevant text of § 14-2-1. It is as follows: 
14-2-1. Definitions - Payment bond required - Right of action - Notice -
Attorneys' fees. 
(1) For purposes of this chapter: 
sje ijc s|c sje sjc 
(b) "Owner" means any person contracting for construction, 
alteration, or repair of any building, structure, or improvement upon 
land. 
(2) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (2)(b), before any 
contract exceeding $2,000 in amount for the construction, alteration, 
or repair of any building, structure, or improvement upon land is 
awarded to any contractor, the owner shall obtain from the contractor 
a payment bond complying with Subsection (3). 
The amount of the contract between Saratoga and Larry Price Construction exceeded 
$2,000.00. (R. at 89, j^ 3.) Saratoga failed, however, to obtain a payment bond from 
Larry Price Construction, as required by Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-1. (R. at 89, ^ 4.) 
Larry Price Construction hired Freewheeling Enterprises, Inc. ("Freewheeling") to 
do some of the work on the sewer system. (R. at 89, ^ f 5.) To perform that work, 
Freewheeling rented equipment from T.S.S. and gave T.S.S. a check for $3,392.57 to be 
applied toward the rental. (R. at 88, f 6.) T.S.S. delivered the equipment to the project 
site. (R. at 88, ^  6.) 
Eventually the $3,392.57 Freewheeling had given to T.S.S. to be applied toward 
the rental was consumed. Consequently, Freewheeling continued to rent the equipment 
from T.S.S. on credit. (R. at 88, ^  7.) The credit agreement between T.S.S. and 
Freewheeling provided for interest at the annual rate of 18%. (R. at 87, ^  11.) It also 
stated T.S.S. would be entitled to recover all costs and attorneys fees incurred in 
collecting any amounts owed. (R. at 87, ^ f 12.) 
On September 24, 1999, Freewheeling's check for $3,392.57 was returned for 
nonsufficient funds. (R. at 88, f 9.) T.S.S. reacquired the equipment the next day. T.S.S. 
never secured any money from Freewheeling against the amount owed. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Payment Bond Statutes impose liability on individuals and entities for failing 
to obtain a payment bond on construction projects where the total of the work exceeds 
4 
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(3) The payment bond shall be . . . for the protection of all persons 
supplying labor, services, equipment, or material in the prosecution of the 
work provided for in the contract in a sum equal to the contract price. 
The Payment Bond Statutes are attached in their entirety as Addendum A to Saratoga's 
brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. 
T.S.S. agrees with Saratoga's recitation of the nature of the case, course of 
proceedings and disposition below. 
B. Statement of Facts. 
T.S.S. does not disagree with any of the facts stated in Saratoga's Brief. However, 
Saratoga has failed to marshal the evidence to include all facts supporting the trial court's 
ruling. Those additional facts are as follows: 
At all relevant times, Saratoga owned several lots within a planned unit 
development known as Saratoga Springs. (R. at 89, ^ f 1.) The Town of Saratoga Springs 
would not agree to approve certain subdivision plats until specific improvements were 
made to the sewer system servicing the subdivision. Consequently, Saratoga hired 
general contractor Larry Price Construction to make those improvements. (R. at 89, *f[ 2.) 
1
 Saratoga's failure to marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's rulings is 
grounds alone for affirming each of those rulings. 
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$2,000. Nowhere do those statutes exclude liability for equipment that is rented. In fact 
case law interpreting the nearly identical federal payment bond statutes routinely hold that 
only rental equipment is protected. Moreover, the legislative history and express purpose 
of the Payment Bond Statutes demonstrate the Legislature intended rental equipment to 
be included within the protections of the Payment Bond Statutes. There is nothing in the 
language or history of the Payment Bond Statues which requires the owner to receive an 
actual benefit from the equipment used. 
The express language of the Payment Bond Statutes sets the amount of liability for 
failure to obtain a payment bond as the reasonable value of the equipment supplied. The 
value of the equipment includes not only the principal amount due for the rental but the 
interest charged as well. It also includes potential liability for attorneys' fees. While the 
statute addressing failure to obtain a payment bond gives the court discretion to award 
attorneys' fees, there is nothing in its language that requires any culpability beyond failure 
to obtain the bond. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED AS A MATTER OF LAW 
THAT $ 14-2-2(1) IMPOSES LIABILITY FOR RENTAL EQUIPMENT. 
Utah Code Section 14-2-2 states, "[A]n owner who fails to obtain a payment bond 
is liable to each person who . . . supplied equipment... for the reasonable value of. . . 
the equipment.. . furnished . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-2(1). The trial court ruled as a 
matter of law that Saratoga was liable to T.S.S. under this section for the value of the 
5 
equipment T.S.S. rented to Freewheeling. Saratoga argues the trial court erroneously 
concluded § 14-2-2(1) imposes liability for rental equipment both under the plain 
meaning of the statute and based on its legislative history. (Saratoga's Brief, pg. 5.) 
Saratoga is wrong on both points. 
A. Plain Meaning of the Statute. 
Saratoga argues the term "furnished" in § 14-2-2(1) excludes coverage for 
equipment that is rented. (Saratoga's Brief, pg. 6.) It cites no support from any source -
statutory, case law or other - supporting its interpretation of the word "furnished." 
There are only two types of equipment that can be supplied or furnished for use on 
a construction project: equipment that is owned and equipment that is rented. Section 
14-2-2(1) makes no distinction between the two. Thomas Jefferson once said, "Laws are 
made for men of ordinary understanding, and should therefore, be construed by the 
ordinary rules of common sense. Their meaning is not to be sought for in metaphysical 
subtleties, which may make anything mean everything or nothing at pleasure." Letter 
from Thomas Jefferson to William Johnson, June 12, 1823. Common sense dictates that 
liability for "equipment... furnished" refers to all equipment provided for use on the 
project, which includes rental equipment. The trial court's ruling should, therefore, be 
affirmed on this ground. 
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B. Legislative History. 
The legislative history of § 14-2-2 also supports the trial court's determination that 
it includes liability for rental equipment. 
1. Historical Amendments. 
Prior to 1985, § 14-2-1, which provides the context for § 14-2-2, extended 
protection only for "material furnished and labor performed under the contract." S.B. 15, 
Forty-Sixth Legis. Sess. (Utah 1985) (attached to Saratoga's Brief as Addendum C.) In 
1985, the Legislature amended the statute to specifically include rented equipment. Id. 
(attached to Saratoga's Brief as Addendum C.) The bill's sponsor stated during a floor 
debate that the purpose of the amendment was to bring the bond law into conformity with 
the mechanic's lien law and to allow recovery for rental equipment. Legis. Rec, January 
21, 1985 (statement of Sen. Carling). It had the additional effect of bringing the statutory 
language in line with the long-standing interpretation of "labor and material" under the 
mother of all modern payment bond statutes, the federal Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. § 270a, et 
seq. ("Miller Act") and other comparable statutes. 
The Legislature amended § 14-2-1 again in 1987. The purpose of the amendment 
was to make the Payment Bond Statutes consistent with the recently-enacted procurement 
code applicable originally to state procurement. Legis. Rec, February 20, 1987 
(statement of Sen. Carling). In Senator Carling's own words, the 1987 amendment made 
"no substantive changes" to the statute but was merely a "recodification" or "reenactment 
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of the current law." Id. However, the 1987 amendment, mistakenly excluded all specific 
references to equipment and referred only to "material furnished and labor supplied." 
S.B. 183, Forty-Seventh Legis. Sess. (Utah 1987) (attached to Saratoga's Brief as 
Addendum D.) Realizing the confusion potentially resulting from the omission, the 
Legislature further amended the statute in 1989 to again to make clear that those 
furnishing equipment on a project had rights to claim and recover on the statutory 
payment bonds. S.B. 198, Forty-Eighth Legis. Sess. (Utah 1989) (attached to Saratoga's 
Brief as Addendum E.) 
2. Application of the Federal Miller Act. 
There are no reported cases addressing whether the current version of § 14-2-2 
imposes liability for rental equipment. However, it would defy decades of interpretation 
and application of similar statutes to suggest that the section's reference to "equipment" 
was intended to be to other than rental equipment or - more illogical still - to bar claims 
for rental equipment. Early versions of Utah's payment bond statutes, governing both 
public and private projects, were modeled almost verbatim after the Miller Act, to the 
point that they are referred to as Utah's "Little Miller Act." See Utah Legislative Survey, 
1984 Utah L. Rev. 115, 127 n.79; Cox Rock Prod v. Walker Pipeline Constr., 754 P.2d 
672, 674 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Utah Courts have in fact turned to the federal statute at 
times to interpret similar provisions in the Utah payment bond statutes. For example, the 
Utah Supreme Court interpreted the notice provisions of § 14-1-6 in a 1970 case and 
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"subscribed to the principles and cases" cited in a federal case involving "the similar 
Miller Act." A.A. Maycock, Inc. v. General Ins. Co. of America, 24 Utah 2d 369, 371-72, 
472 P.2d 424, 426 (1970). 
The Miller Act has never expressly referred to "equipment" as an element of either 
"labor or material" for which a bond claim might be had by an unpaid subcontractor or 
supplier. It is well settled, nonetheless, that equipment rental (as opposed to capital 
expenditures for equipment purchases) is within the scope of "material" under the Miller 
Act. The Tenth Circuit has expressly ruled that equipment used on a project that is not 
rental equipment (i.e., owned by the user) does not fall within the protections of the 
Miller Act. However, rental equipment does. It explained, "[A] purchase of such 
equipment is not covered because the seller is not supplying materials to be consumed on 
the bonded project." U.S. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 634 F.2d at 1050 (citing Continental Casualty 
Co. v. Clarence L. Boyd Co., 140 F.2d 115 (10th Cir. 1944)). However, "[A] fair rental 
charge for the use of [] equipment... is within the purview of the Miller Act bond 
because the value of the lease payment is substantially consumed in the project." Id. at 
1052. 
3. Historical Interpretation of Payment Bond Statutes. 
Utah's Payment Bond Statutes, otherwise referred to as Utah's Little Miller Act, 
have undergone several structural revisions since 1963. As Saratoga has observed, some 
of those revisions have apparently confused the issue of whether or not "equipment" is 
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within the scope of "labor or material" - this despite decades of interpretation of 
comparable statutes in favor of including equipment. Saratoga's argument that Utah's 
Legislature did not intend to include rental equipment within the protections of the 
Payment Bond Statutes because it amended them in 1985 to include rental equipment but 
replaced that provision in 1987 with a version that referred generally only to "equipment," 
without any reference to "rental" is both illogical and misleading. At a minimum, 
Saratoga unnecessarily confuses the legislative history in favor of unwarranted and 
overly-narrow conclusions. 
Nowhere in Utah's relevant case law (including the cases upon which Saratoga 
relies) or in the history of the payment bond legislation is there any suggestion that, when 
equipment is covered, it refers to equipment purchased in connection with a subcontract, 
as opposed to equipment rented by a contractor. The logic of the Miller Act cases cited 
above and providing coverage for rental equipment only remains as sound as ever. 
Saratoga cites Johnson v. Gallegos Const Co., 785 P.2d 1109 (Utah 1990) and 
Graco Fishing v. Ironwood Exploration, 766 P.2d 1074 (Utah 1988) as support for its 
argument that the Legislature did not intend to include rental equipment within the 
protections of the payment bond statutes. Neither case supports the proffered conclusion, 
however. In fact, both cases involve interpretation and application of statutory payment 
bond provisions that failed in the versions then applicable to specifically acknowledge 
claims for "equipment" as part of "labor or materials." 
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The plaintiffs in Johnson rented equipment to a subcontractor on a state project. 
Johnson, 785 P.2d at 1110. The subcontractor failed to pay for the rentals and the 
plaintiffs sued on the payment bond to recover the reasonable rental value of the 
equipment. The issue before the court in Johnson was whether equipment rental charges 
were within the scope of the phrase 'labor or materiar under the payment bond 
provisions of the Utah Procurement Code, Utah Code Ann. § 63-56-38, et seq. Id. 
Relying on the absence of any reference to "equipment" under the payment bond 
provisions, the court concluded "the term iabor and material' as used in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-56-38 did not include rent for equipment." Id. at 1112. 
The plaintiff in Graco rented equipment to a subcontractor on a private project. 
Graco, 766 P.2d at 1075-76. The subcontractor failed to pay for the rental and the 
plaintiff sued the owner of the project for failure to obtain a payment bond, as required by 
§ 14-2-1. At that time, § 14-2-2 stated, "'Any person . . . who shall fail to obtain such 
good and sufficient bond . . . shall be personally liable to all persons who have furnished 
materials or performed labor under the contract for the reasonable value of such materials 
furnished or labor performed . . . . ' " Id. at 1078 (second alteration in original). While the 
statute was subsequently amended to include charges for equipment, it made no specific 
mention of equipment at the time the claims arose. Id. at 1079. The court therefore 
concluded the owner was not liable for the equipment rental. Id. 
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Johnson and Graco are clearly distinguishable from the facts of this case because 
the statutes in place at the time of those cases made no reference whatsoever to 
equipment, and the courts were unwilling to expand to equipment the protection afforded 
for labor and materials. By contrast, the version of the statute applicable in this case 
expressly permits recovery for "the reasonable value of. . . equipment... furnished . . . . " 
Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-2(1). Consequently, neither Johnson nor Graco have any bearing 
on this case, other than in Graco"s recognition of a broader principle that actually 
supports T.S.S.'s position. As the Graco court stated, "[0]ur statutes are to be liberally 
construed to give effect to their purpose and to promote justice . . . ." Graco, 766 P.2d at 
1079. The court continued: 
In order to impose upon [a property owner] such additional burdens 
[beyond what he contracted to bear for the improvement of his property] the 
law must clearly spell out the responsibility. Otherwise, the entering into a 
contract for the improvement of one's property might open the door to 
unforeseeable risks for the property owner. He is aware of the amount of 
work to be done upon his property and fairly may be charged with 
knowledge of the extent thereof. 
Id. At the time Saratoga contracted for the improvements at issue, the Payment Bond 
Statutes expressly required it, as the entity contracting for the work to be done, to obtain a 
payment bond "for the protection of all persons supplying . . . equipment..." Utah Code 
Ann. § 14-2-1(3). The consequence of failure to honor this statutory requirement is direct 
liability "to each person . . . who supplied equipment... for the reasonable value of. . . 
the equipment. . . furnished up to but not exceeding the contract price." The Legislature 
12 
clearly declared that by failing to provide a payment bond, Saratoga could be held liable 
for unpaid rental equipment. Saratoga cannot, therefore, argue the risk was unforeseeable 
or that it should not be charged with the knowledge it might be held liable. 
Saratoga also cites Western Coating, Inc. v. Gibbons & Reed, 788 P.2d 503 (Utah 
1990), as support for its argument. Saratoga argues the Utah Legislature consciously 
amended the Payment Bond Statute to eliminate coverage for rental equipment and cites 
Western Coating for that assertion. (Saratoga's Brief, pg. 9.) In fact, there is no support 
in Western Coating for the "conscious amendment" conclusion. The "sole issue" in 
Western Coating was "whether third-tier suppliers are covered by the then-applicable 
version of the Utah Procurement Code." Id. at 503. In addressing that issue, the Court 
gave significant deference to interpretation of the Miller Act denying such coverage. The 
court did note in dicta that "the absence of language [in the payment bond provisions of 
the Procurement Code] covering rental of equipment manifested an intent by the 
legislature not to include such rental." Id. at 504. However, as with the other cases cited 
by Saratoga, the version of the payment bond provisions applicable in that case was a 
version referring only to claims for "labor or material." There is nothing whatsoever in 
the case indicating the Legislature ever eliminated coverage for rental equipment from the 
Payment Bond Statutes. 
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4. Remaining Arguments. 
To avoid the problems associated with these cases, Saratoga argues the Utah 
mechanics' lien statute, Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-3, which extends the right to file a lien to 
those "furnishing or renting any materials or equipment," demonstrates the Legislature 
intended to exclude rental equipment from the Payment Bond Statutes since it used the 
term "renting" in § 38-1-3 but not the Payment Bond Statutes. (Saratoga's Brief, pgs. 10-
11.) However, it offers no support for that argument, which is illogical in light of the 
legislative history of the Payment Bond Statutes and cases addressing them. The intent of 
the Legislature, from the legislative history explained above, demonstrates an intent to 
include rental equipment, not exclude it. 
Saratoga also argues as support for this point that a company that rents equipment 
for which it is not paid bears a much lower risk than a company that sells equipment for 
use on a project because the rental company will obtain the return of its equipment and 
can later rent it to other customers whereas a company that sells the equipment will lose 
the entire value of the equipment if not paid. (Saratoga's Brief, pgs. 11-12.) This 
argument is faulty for two reasons. First, Saratoga did not raise it below and, therefore, 
waived it for purposes of this appeal. Second, the argument fails to recognize that if not 
allowed to recover under the Payment Bond Statutes, the rental company is out the 
amount it is entitled to for rent and cannot later recover it. The purchasing company, 
however, could repossess equipment sold for use on a project. Anything incorporated 
14 
into the project which could not be repossessed, such a the lumber mentioned in 
Saratoga's brief, is not equipment but materials, which are provided for in the statute. 
The plain language of § 14-2-2 as well as its legislative history demonstrate it 
imposes liability for rental equipment. The trial court's ruling on this issue should 
therefore be affirmed. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED AS A MATTER OF LAW 
THAT § 14-2-2(1) DOES NOT REQUIRE SARATOGA TO RECEIVE A 
BENEFIT AS A PREREQUISITE TO ITS LIABILITY. 
Saratoga argues that imposing liability on it under the facts of this case would not 
be consistent with the purpose behind the Payment Bond Statutes because the Payment 
Bond Statutes were enacted to ensure that the risk of loss for failure to obtain a payment 
bond is borne by the person or entity for whose benefit the underlying improvement was 
made. Saratoga asserts it received no "benefit" because the subcontractor that rented the 
equipment from T.S.S. failed to properly perform its work, which Saratoga claims it then 
removed and replaced. There is no assertion that T.S.S. was somehow involved in or 
responsible for the allegedly faulty work. Nonetheless, Saratoga claims allowing T.S.S. 
to recover the reasonable value of the rental equipment would defeat the purpose of the 
Payment Bond Statutes. 
The primary purpose of the Payment Bond Statutes, and the one expressly 
enumerated by the Legislature, is "for the protection of all persons supplying . . . 
equipment... in the prosecution of the work provided for in the contract in a sum equal 
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to the contract price." Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-1(3). The Wagner case, which Saratoga 
cites in support of its argument, is consistent. It states, "'[T]hese statutes should be 
interpreted and applied in such a manner as to carry out the purpose for which they were 
created: to protect those who supply labor and materials."' John Wagner Associates v. 
Hercules, Inc., 797 P.2d 1123 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (quoting King Bros.} Inc. v. Utah Dry 
Kiln Co., 440 P.2d 17, 18 (Utah 1968)) (alteration in original). With the 1989 amendment 
to § 14-2-1, the purpose is also to protect those supplying equipment. The court in 
Wagner went on to state: 
If the owner requires the contractor to procure the statutory bond, he is 
protected against loss. If he does not, he becomes liable to laborers and 
materialmen if the contractor fails to pay them, even though he may have 
paid the contractor in full. He has his remedy in his own hands. 
Id. at 1126 (quoting Rio Grande Lumber Co. v. Darke, 167 P. 241, 244, 46 (1917)) 
(emphasis omitted). 
The focus of the statute is to shift the risk of loss to the one in the best position to 
ensure compliance. The owner can choose either to obtain a payment bond or assume the 
risk of having to pay twice. The owner, as the "employer" of everyone on the project is, 
after all, in the best position to ensure compliance. At the very least, he is certainly in a 
better position than the remote equipment supplier. That is why the Legislature shifted 
the burden to him. 
Saratoga argues that the phrase "reasonable value of the . . . equipment... 
furnished" contemplates some type of value to the owner. It cites no authority 
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whatsoever - statutory, case law, legislative history or otherwise - for its position. Its 
interpretation is contrary to the common sense meaning of the statute, which contemplates 
the supplier of the equipment is to be compensated for the value of it to the supplier. 
Here, that is the rental amount. In a further attempt to attack, it argues for the first time 
on appeal that T.S.S. "could not establish any value by which the court could measure 
reimbursement that could possibly be due TSS." (Saratoga's Brief, pg. 17.) The 
evidence is to the contrary. The record details the principal amount of the rental charges 
and the interest due and the rate at which the interest was calculated. (R. at 87-88, Ifij 10-
11.) Saratoga never objected in any way to these calculations below. 
Saratoga makes two additional arguments on this point in passing footnotes. First, 
it argues T.S.S. was a supplier to a subcontractor on the project and it is unclear that the 
Payment Bond Statutes permit it to recover as a sub-subcontractor. (Saratoga's Brief, pg. 
17 n.9.) This argument is contrary to the language and purpose of the Payment Bond 
Statutes. Section 14-2-1 states the payment bond is required "for the protection of all 
persons supplying labor, services, equipment, or material in the prosecution of the work 
provided for in the contract.. . ." The only limitation on how far this protection extends 
is that the labor, materials or equipment be supplied for use on the project. There was no 
dispute below that the equipment was used on Saratoga's project. Second, Saratoga 
2
 Saratoga states on pg.13 footnote 6 of its brief that there is no assurance the 
T.S.S. equipment was used on its project. However, it failed to raise this point below and 
has, therefore, waived it for purposes of this appeal. 
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argues T.S.S. never provided a notice of claim "to the contractor." (Saratoga's Brief, pgs. 
17-18 n.9.) There is no evidence in the record supporting this assertion. Consequently, it 
cannot be considered on appeal. 
Saratoga had the statutory burden of obtaining a payment bond. It failed to satisfy 
that burden. Consequently, it should bear the responsibility of failing to meet its statutory 
duties, not T.S.S. The trial court's ruling should thus be affirmed on this issue. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY ACTED WITHIN ITS BROAD 
DISCRETION IN AWARDING T.S.S. ITS ATTORNEYS' FEES UNDER 
UTAH CODE ANN. $ 14-2-2(3). 
Section 14-2-2(3), authorizes an award of attorneys' fees to a party who prevails 
on a claim for failure to obtain a payment bond. The section specifically provides, "In an 
action for failure to obtain a bond, the court may award reasonable attorneys' fees to the 
prevailing party." It is clear from the language of the statute that courts have discretion to 
award fees under that section. Bailey-Allen Co., Inc. v. Kurzet, 876 P.2d 421, 428 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994). An award or denial of fees requested under that section by a prevailing 
party is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Id. at 428. 
A. Cases Interpreting the Payment Bond Statutes. 
Bailey-Allen is the only reported case addressing in any context a request for 
attorneys' fees under the provisions of the Payment Bond Statutes. The trial court in 
Bailey-Allen granted partial summary judgment dismissing the general contractor's claims 
against the defendants/owners under the mechanics lien statutes and for their failure to 
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require a payment bond, but denied their request for fees without explanation. The Utah 
Court of Appeals recognized that an award of fees under the statute was discretionary and 
that a review of the denial was to be conducted under the abuse of discretion standard. 
Because the trial court failed to explain its denial, however, there were no findings of fact 
on which to conduct a review. The court stated, "[I]n order for this court to conduct a 
meaningful review of that determination [to deny fees under the statute], we must rely on 
adequate findings of fact which are absent in this case." Id. at 428 (internal citation 
omitted). The Court of Appeals therefore remanded the case to the trial court for further 
findings on its denial of the requested fees. It also provided additional guidance to the 
trial court in making its decision stating, "When determining whether attorney fees should 
be awarded under the Bond Statute, the trial court should consider precedent treating the 
Bond Statute as auxiliary to the Mechanics' Lien Statute and as sharing with it a common 
purpose." Id. On remand, the trial court awarded fees to the plaintiffs, as the prevailing 
parties on the Bond and Mechanics' Lien claims. See Bailey-Allen Co., Inc. v. Kurzet, 
945 P.2d 180 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
The court in John Wagner Associates v. Hercules, Inc., 797 P.2d 1123 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990), addressed the purposes of the Mechanics' Lien and Payment Bond Statutes 
together. It stated: 
The aim and purpose of our mechanic's lien law manifestly has been 
to protect, at all hazards, those who perform the labor and furnish the 
materials which enter into the construction of a building or other 
improvement. The result has been that the owner of the premises, at whose 
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instance and for whose benefit the improvement is made, has been the one 
most likely to suffer loss. He pays at his peril the original contractor, who 
generally needs it and demands it as the work progresses. 
If he does not reserve enough of the fund in his own hands to pay for 
the labor of subcontractors and employees, and the price of materials, he 
incurs the risk of having to pay over again for at least a part of these items. 
The bond, as in this case[,] is conditioned for the faithful 
performance of the contract and securing the payment of the laborers and 
materialmen. If the owner requires the contractor to procure the statutory 
bond, he is protected against loss. If he does not, he becomes liable to 
laborers and materialmen if the contractor fails to pay them, even though 
he may have paid the contractor in full. He has his remedy in his own 
hands. 
Id at 1125 (quoting Rio Grande Lumber Co. v. Darke, 167 P. 241, 244, 246 (1917) 
(emphases added, emphases in original omitted, alterations in original). 
The purposes of the Mechanic's Lien and the broader Payment Bond Statutes, 
applicable to both public and private projects and examined in conjunction with the facts 
of this case, support an award to T.S.S. of the attorneys fees incurred in pursuing and 
collecting its judgment against Saratoga. Saratoga was statutorily required to obtain a 
payment bond for the project for the benefit of unpaid suppliers and subcontractors. For 
whatever reason, it failed to do so, and, by statute, was thus exposed to the risk of direct 
liability to unpaid suppliers and subcontractors. Even in the absence of a payment bond, 
Saratoga could have protected itself by withholding from its contractor the amount of 
money earmarked for payment to all subcontractors. 
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B. Purpose of the Payment Bond Statutes. 
The context in which the Payment Bond Statute operates demonstrates an inherent 
presumption that attorneys' fees should generally be awarded in cases involving claims by 
unpaid suppliers and subcontractors. Had Saratoga furnished a payment bond, as it was 
statutorily required to do, T.S.S. would have had rights against the bond, under § 14-2-1. 
Had T.S.S. prevailed on that claim, as it did here, it would have been entitled to attorneys' 
fees by statute. Section 14-2-1(7) provides that the court "shall award reasonable 
attorneys' fees to the prevailing party" in such an action. Court discretion in that instance 
would be limited to a determination of a reasonable fee. Moreover, had T.S.S. pursued 
and prevailed on a mechanics' lien claim, it would likewise have been entitled to its fees. 
Utah Code Ann. §38-1-18. 
Only in extraordinary circumstances should the result be different when the claim 
is against the owner for its failure to require or obtain a payment bond from its 
contractors. Examples of such instances might be the following: 1) when a claim for 
failure to obtain a payment bond is expeditiously and promptly resolved without the need 
for litigation or substantial attorney involvement but where fees are nevertheless 
generated; 2) when a payment bond claim succeeds in conjunction with a mechanics' lien 
foreclosure action, since an award of fees on the foreclosure claim is mandatory and the 
payment bond claim might be duplicative; 3) where the supplier or laborer may combine 
an action against the owner with a contract claim against the person or entity who 
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contracted for the goods or services but failed to pay for them and ultimately collects 
from that entity; or 4) when a supplier files a good-faith claim against an owner for failure 
to obtain a payment bond but does not prevail because of a technical difficulty and the 
owner seeks fees as the prevailing party. 
This case offers none of the suggested circumstances, nor any other facts which 
might militate against an award of fees. In fact, T.S.S. was forced into litigation to 
preserve and enforce its rights and only by recovering its fees will T.S.S. come close to 
being made whole for the failure of payment in this case. The specific facts of this case 
further demonstrate why an award of fees is so important. The principal balance owed for 
equipment T.S.S. supplied to the Project was just greater than $3,800.00. The fees T.S.S. 
incurred in obtaining its judgment was slightly more than twice the principal balance. If 
there were no possibility that T.S.S. might be awarded its attorneys' fees in pursuing its 
statutory right to payment from Saratoga, T.S.S. likely would have been left to conclude 
the costs of pursuing those rights outweighed the benefits and, therefore, declined to 
pursue the amounts owed. This could have potentially devastating effects on not only 
T.S.S. but on the industry as a whole, licensing owners who have failed to provide for the 
bond protection required by statute to effectively thumb their nose at claimants unwilling 
to undertake the cost of pursuing valid claims. That is precisely the reason the 
Legislature made payment bonds mandatory instead of permissive. 
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There has never been any dispute that the decision whether to award attorneys' 
fees under 14-2-2(3) is discretionary. Based on these facts as applied to controlling case 
law, the district court judge properly exercised his discretion in awarding T.S.S. its 
attorneys' fees incurred in obtaining the judgment against Saratoga as well as those 
incurred in collecting the judgment. Saratoga has failed to apply the correct standard of 
law and demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion. Instead it argues 14-2-2(3) 
requires more than failure to obtain a payment bond to award attorneys' fees. It asserts, 
"[T]he Court must find something beyond mere liability . . . ." (Saratoga's Brief, pg. 19.) 
Again, there is no support for this argument, which plainly contradicts that language of 
the statute. There is nothing in that language which requires anything beyond failure to 
provide a payment bond. 
Saratoga also argues the equities do not favor an award of attorneys' fees. 
Saratoga first argues it was not in privity with T.S.S. and, therefore, should not be 
required to pay its fees. The issue of privity is immaterial. The Payment Bond Statutes 
impose direct liability on owners for failure to obtain a payment bond, without regard to 
privity. They require only that the subcontractor furnish equipment to the project and that 
the equipment be used on the project. That is precisely what happened in this case. 
Saratoga further argues T.S.S. should bear the risk because Saratoga did not 
receive any ultimate benefit from the equipment T.S.S. supplied to the project. Saratoga's 
reasoning is faulty and is one more example of its repeated attempts to avoid the natural 
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consequences of its failure to comply with its statutory obligations. Apparently, the work 
performed by the subcontractor who used T.S.S.' equipment did not meet the owner's 
contract requirements. That, however, is not T.S.S.' fault. There was never any assertion 
or evidence that the work was not properly done because T.S.S.' equipment was faulty. 
T.S.S. is not the insurer of those contractors to whom it rents equipment and should not 
be forced to bear the burden of absorbing the costs of their allegedly defective work. 
Saratoga, unlike T.S.S., had the ability and obligation to protect itself and others, 
including T.S.S., by obtaining contractor performance and payment bond. 
Had Saratoga furnished a payment bond, as it was statutorily required to do, T.S.S. 
would have had rights against the bond, under § 14-2-1. Had T.S.S. prevailed on that 
claim, as it did here, it would have been entitled to attorneys' fees, by statute. Utah Code 
Ann. § 14-2-1(7). T.S.S. should not be penalized for Saratoga's failure to obtain the 
required bond. Even in the absence of the payment bond, Saratoga could have eliminated 
liability for fees by simply paying T.S.S. for the rental equipment used on the project. It 
failed to do so. Once again, T.S.S. should not be punished for Saratoga's decision to 
challenge its statutory obligations. As aptly stated by the Court in John Wagner, "He 
[Saratoga] ha[d] his remedy in his own hands." John Wagner Associates v. Hercules, 
Inc., 797 P.2d at 1125 (quoting Rio Grande, 167 P. at 244, 246 (1917)). Consequently, 
Saratoga is the one who more appropriately bears the risk, which includes the costs and 
fees necessary for T.S.S., the unpaid supplier, to enforce its rights. 
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In its statement of issues at the beginning of its brief (pg. 2, III.), Saratoga states an 
issue to be decided by the Court is whether the amount of fees the Court awarded T.S.S. 
was unreasonable. It fails, however, to offer any argument in its brief that the amount of 
fees awarded was anything but reasonable. Therefore, this issue should be summarily 
decided in favor of T.S.S. Even if it had presented argument in its brief that the fees were 
unreasonable, it did not object to the amount awarded below and, therefore, waived the 
issue. In fact, at the hearing to determine the amount of fees, the trial judge specifically 
asked counsel for Saratoga if he had any objection to the amount of fees requested. He 
stated he did not. 
Saratoga has failed to demonstrate that based on the above, the trial court abused 
its discretion in awarding T.S.S. is attornevs' fees or that the amount of fees awarded was 
unreasonable. The award of fees should, therefore, be affirmed. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED AS A MATTER OF LAW 
THAT T.S.S. WAS ENTITLED TO INTEREST ON ITS JUDGMENT 
AGAINST SARATOGA AT THE CONTRACT RATE OF 18%. 
Saratoga raises for the first time on appeal the argument that T.S.S. is not entitled 
to interest at the contract rate of 18%. Nowhere below did it preserve this argument. In 
fact, counsel for Saratoga approved the order awarding interest at the rate of 18%. 
Consequently, it has waived this issue and cannot now assert it. 
Nevertheless, the Utah Supreme Court already ruled in Oscar E. Chytrans Co., Inv. 
v. Wasatch Furnace & Electric, Inc., 502 P.2d 554 (1972) that the Payment Bond Statutes 
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peimit interest to be calculated at the underlying contract rate. That ruling, which the 
trial court followed in this case, is consistent with the purpose of the Payment Bond 
Statutes of "protecting] [] all persons supplying equipment. . ." in the amount of the 
"reasonable value of the . . . equipment. . . furnished . . . ." Utah Code Ann. §§ 14-2-1 & 
14-2-2. The reasonable value of the equipment in this case includes the principal rental 
amount as well as the 18% interest from the date the payment was due. Accordingly, the 
trial court correctly ruled that T.S.S. was entitled to collect interest at that rate from 
Saratoga and should be affirmed on that issue. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, T.S.S. respectfully requests that this Court affirm each 
of the trial court's rulings. 
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